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CRIMINAL LAW-SIFTING THROUGH THE "MIXTURE" PROBLEM 
TO 	DETERMINE A DRUG OFFENDER'S SENTENCE' 
INTRODUCTION 
In an effort to crack down on the sale and use of illegal drugs in 
this country, Congress revised the sentencing scheme for federally 
convicted drug offenders.2 Congress decided to take a hard line ap­
proach and sentence drug offenders based on the weight of drugs in­
stead of just the classification of drugs. 3 Moreover, Congress decided 
to include not only the weight of the drug itself, but also any additives4 
1. In November of 1993, the United States Sentencing Commission plans to publish 
revisions to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines which will define "mixture." See Amend­
ments to the Sentencing Guidelines for the United States Courts, 58 Fed. Reg. 27,148 
(1993) (proposed May 6, 1993). These regulations provide for the following amendment: 
Mixture or substance does not include materials that must be separated from the 
controlled substance before the controlled substance can be used. Examples of 
such materials include the fiberglass in a cocaine/fiberglass bonded suitcase, bees­
wax in a cocainelbeeswax statue, and waste water from an illicit laboratory used 
to manufacture a controlled substance. If such material cannot readily be sepa­
rated from the mixture or substance that appropriately is counted in the Drug 
Quantity Table, the court may use any reasonable method to approximate the 
weight of the mixture or substance to be counted. 
Id. at 27,155. The Commission is now accepting comments on this revision; thus, the 
amendment is subject to change. The Commission explains that the "amendment is 
designed to resolve an inter-circuit conflict regarding the meaning of the term 'mixture or 
substance,' as used in Section 2D 1.1" of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The Commis­
sion has provided that only substances which "must be separated from the controlled sub­
stance" will not be weighed with the drug. Id. (emphasis added). A problem still exists 
with substances such as alcohol which do not have to be separated from cocaine before the 
drug could be used. See infra notes 153-91 and accompanying text for an analysis of usable 
mixture agents which should not be included with the weight of the drug. 
2. Controlled Substances Penalties Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473. 
98 Stat. 2068 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 802, 811, 812, 822-24, 827, 841. 
843,845, 845a, 873, 881, 952, 953, 957, 958, 960, 962 (1988». This Act is chapter five of 
the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984). 
3. S. REp. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 255 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3182, 3437. 	 Congress said: 
While it is appropriate that the relative dangerousness of a particular drug should 
have a bearing on the penalty for its importation or distribution, another impor­
tant factor is the amount of drug involved. Without the inclusion of this factor, 
penalties for trafficking in especially large quantities of extremely dangerous 
drugs are often inadequate. 
Id. 
4. For example, cocaine is usually mixed with lactose or dextrose to dilute its 
strength. This mixing process is called "cutting" the drug. See Gerald T. McLaughlin. 
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"mixed" with the drug. S The intended result was for a drug dealer 
with more drugs to get a longer sentence than a drug dealer with less 
drugs. 
A problem arose when a judge confronted a substance that could 
be considered a container and yet was "mixed" with the drug.6 For 
instance, in United States v. Mahecha-Onofre, 7 the government confis­
cated cocaine which was chemically bonded to a suitcase. A suitcase 
would normally be thought of as a container in which drugs are 
placed. However, in this case, the cocaine was actually chemically 
bonded with the fabric of the suitcase and thus, the drug was "mixed" 
with the container. 8 Should the suitcase be included in the weight of 
the drug for sentencing purposes? The United States Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit answered this question in the affirmative.9 Con­
versely, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, 
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that not all additives, which 
are chemically mixed with the drug, should be included with the 
weight of the drug for sentencing purposes. IO 
The only United States Supreme Court case to address the issue 
of "mixtures" is Chapman v. United States .11 In Chapman, the Court 
Cocaine: The History and Regulation ofa Dangerous Drug, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 537, 550 
(1973). 
5. Narcotics Penalties and Enforcement Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 
3207-2 (1986) (codified as amended at, 21 U.S.C. §§ 802, 841, 845, 845a, 848, 881,960,962 
(1988); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553, 3583 (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 994 (1988); FED. R. CIUM. P. 35). 
This Act is Subtitle A of Title I of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 
100 Stat. 3207 (1986). 
6. Chapman v. United States, III S. Ct. 1919, 1925 (1991). The Court held that 
"weights of containers and packaging materials generally are not included in determining a 
sentence for drug distribution, but that is because those items are also clearly not mixed or 
otherwise combined with the drug." Id. at 1926. However, it appears that neither Con­
gress nor the Chapman Court foresaw the possibility of nonusuable containers being mixed 
with the drug as they did not directly address this issue. 
7. 936 F.2d 623 (1st Cir.), cerro denied, 112 S. Ct. 648 (1991). See infra text accom­
panying notes 145- 48 for a full discussion of this case. 
8. Mahecha-Onofre, 936 F.2d at 626. 
9. Id. 
10. See United States V. Rodriguez, 975 F.2d 999 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that boric 
acid and cocaine chemically combined was not a mixture); United States V. Robins, 967 
F.2d 1387 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that cornmeal and cocaine did not constitute a mixture 
and that only the cocaine should be used in calculating the weight under the Federal Sen­
tencing Guidelines); United States v. Bristol, 964 F.2d 1088 (11th Cir. 1992) (ruling that 
dissolving cocaine in wine did not produce a mixture); United States v. Acosta, 963 F.2d 
551, 554 (2d Cir. 1992) (concluding that dissolved cocaine in creme liqueur was not an 
ingestible mixture and therefore the liqueur should not be included with the weight of the 
cocaine). 
11. III S. Ct. 1919 (1991). See infra text accompanying notes 83-111 for a full dis­
cussion of the majority and dissenting opinions. There appears to be a disagreement among 
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attempted to clarify whether the term "mixture" required the weight 
of the "carrier medium"12 to be included in the total weight of the 
drug for sentencing purposes. The Court held that the blotter paper 
which was used as the "carrier medium" for the drug lysergic acid 
diethylamide (LSD) must be weighed with the pure LSD drug to cal­
culate the defendant's sentence. Although the facts of Chapman deal 
only with the drug LSD, the analysis can be applied to any drug. 13 
This Note analyzes the Chapman decision and suggests that 
Chapman set forth a "test" to define the term "mixture." This Note 
then discusses the relevant circuit court decisions which have applied 
Chapman, and then determines whether their approach follows the 
Chapman "test." Finally, this Note reaches two conclusions: first, the 
First Circuit's approach of including a suitcase with the weight of the 
cocaine for sentencing was erroneous; and second, the Second, Third, 
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits reached the proper conclusion of exclud­
ing the weight of certain additives from sentencing, but should have 
used a different analysis to reach their conclusion. 14 
the Supreme Court Justices as to whether the Supreme Court should hear this issue again. 
See Walker v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 443 (1992), in which Justice White and Justice 
Blackmun dissented from the denial of a writ of certiorari. The issue on appeal was 
whether the weight of waste product that is part of the by-product of the drug should be 
included in the weight of the drug for sentencing purposes. See infra note 14 for a discus­
sion of this issue. 
12. "Carrier medium" was the term used by the Supreme Court in Chapman to de­
scribe the blotter paper that the convicted drug dealer placed the dose of LSD onto so that 
the dealer could effectively distribute the LSD. Chapman, 111 S. Ct. at 1928. Because the 
dose of LSD is so small, the drug must be placed onto a "carrier." Id. See Michelle Rome 
Kallam, Note, Let the Punishment Fit the Crime: State v. Newton, Chapman v. United 
States and the Problem ofPurity and Prosecutions, 52 LA. L. REV. 1267, 1282 (1992) for 
one commentator's analysis of the Supreme Court's handling of the term "carrier 
medium." 
13. See infra text accompanying notes 153-88. 
14. This Note will not address the issue of whether the liquid waste by-product from 
making laboratory drugs should be included in the weight as a "mixture." In United States 
v. Jennings, 945 F.2d 129, 131 (6th Cir. 1991), the defendant was convicted of manufactur­
ing methamphetamine. The police raided the defendant's laboratory and confiscated a 
crockpot of chemicals containing a poisonous by-product with a small amount of 
methamphetamine. Id. at 134. A chemist testified that if the chemicals had completely 
reacted, they would have produced a much smaller amount of pure methamphetamine than 
was recovered. Id. Based on this testimony, the court reasoned that the entire mixture 
should not be weighed since the defendants could neither have produced that amount of 
methamphetamine or distributed the mixture in the form the police found the mixture. Id. 
at 136. This Note only addresses the issue of chemically combined additives with drugs. 
The circuit courts have reached different results on whether to include waste by-products. 
Compare United States v. Walker, 960 F.2d 409 (5th Cir.) (holding that including the 
weight of the liquid waste material of methamphetamine was proper because the waste was 
mixed with the drug when it was seized), cen. denied, 113 S. Ct. 443 (1992). 
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Section I.A analyzes the history and purpose of the Controlled 
Substances Act,IS the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,16 
and the Narcotics Penalties and Enforcement Act of 198617 to deter­
mine what Congress intended when it included the word "mixture." 
Section I.B discusses the majority and dissenting opinions of Chapman 
v. United States .18 Section II discusses the conflicting circuit court 
opinions. Section III suggests that although never explicitly stated by 
the Supreme Court, the Chapman decision defined a three prong 
"test" to lead lower courts to the proper analysis for considering "mix­
tures" for sentencing purposes. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Sentencing the Drug Offender 
Today, a judge may sentence a drug offender only within the dic­
tates of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines l9 ("Guidelines") and the 
Narcotics Penalties and Enforcement Act of 198620 ("NPEA"). The 
Guidelines and the NPEA instruct a judge to calculate a sentence 
based on the weight of a "mixture" of drugs.21 However, the Guide­
lines and the NPEA do not explicitly define "mixture" or what types 
of additives should be included when weighing a drug. 
The Controlled Substances Act ("CSA"),22 which was enacted in 
15. Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (1970) (codified as 
amended at, 21 U.S.C. §§ 321, 331, 333, 334, 360, 372, 381 (1988); 18 u.s.c. §§ 1114,1952 
(1988); 42 u.s.c. 242 (1988»; see infra text accompanying notes 22-25. 
16. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 
(1984). Within this Act there are two chapters which this note discusses: Chapter Twcr­
Sentencing Reform and Chapter Five-Drug Enforcement Amendments. See infra text 
accompanying notes 26-47. 
17. Narcotics Penalties and Enforcement Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 
3207-2 (1986) (codified as amended at, 21 U.S.C. §§ 802, 841, 845, 845a, 848, 881,960,962 
(1988); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553, 3583 (1988); 28 U.S.c. §,994 (1988); FED. R. CRIM. P. 35). 
This Act is Subtitle A of Title I of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 
100 Stat. 3207 (1986). 
18. 111 S. Ct. 1919 (1991). 
19. United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (Nov. 1992) [hereinaf­
ter "U.S.S.G."]; see 28 U.S.C. § 991 (1988). These guidelines were enacted into law on 
November I, 1987. U.S.S.G. Ch.l, Pt.A, intro. historical note. 
20. Narcotics Penalties and Enforcement Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 
3207-2 (1986) (codified as amended at, 21 U.S.c. §§ 802, 841, 845, 845a, 848, 881,960,962 
(1988); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553, 3583 (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 994 (1988); FED. R. CRIM. P. 35). 
This Act is Subtitle A of Title I of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 
100 Stat. 3207 (1986). 
21. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b), 96O(b) (1988, Supp. II 1990 & Supp. III 1991) and 
U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l for the "mixture" language. 
22. Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (1970) (codified as 
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1970, established the first comprehensive system for sentencing drug 
offenders.23 The CSA categorized drugs into five different schedules 
with the most dangerous drugs listed in Schedule I and the least dan­
gerous drugs in Schedule V. Furthermore, within Schedule I and II, 
there were two additional classifications: narcotic or nonnarcotic.24 
Under this classification system, a judge imposed a sentence based on 
the schedule and, if applicable, the classification of the particular drug. 
The amount of the drug that the defendant possessed was irrelevant. 
This legislation represented a comprehensive approach to control ille­
gal as well as legal drug possession, manufacture, and distribution.25 
In 1984, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Crime Control Act 
of 1984 ("CCCA").26 The CCCA 27 made significant improvements in 
all areas of federal criminal laws. This Act replaced the CSA and sub­
stantially changed not only substantive criminal laws, but also crimi­
nal procedure and administration.28 The CCCA consisted of twelve 
chapters29 that covered such areas as bail, sentencing, violent crime, 
child pornography, bank fraud and wire tapping.30 Two chapters spe­
cifically addressed sentencing drug offenders: Chapter Two-Sentenc­
ing Reform and Chapter Five-Drug Enforcement Amendments. 
amended at, 21 U.S.c. §§ 321, 331, 333, 334, 360, 372, 381 (1988); 18 U.S.c. §§ 1114,1952 
(1988); 42 U.S.C. 242 (1988». 
23. H.R. REP. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970), reprinted in 1970 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566,4567. The Controlled Substances Act was title II of the Comprehen­
sive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, PUb. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 
(1970). Specifically, the House Report stated the principal purpose of the bill as follows: 
This legislation is designed to deal in a comprehensive fashion with the growing 
menace of drug abuse in the United States (1) through providing authority for 
increased efforts in drug abuse prevention and rehabilitation of users, (2) through 
providing more effective means for law enforcement aspects of drug abuse preven­
tion and control, and (3) by providing for an overall balanced scheme of criminal 
penalties for offenses involving drugs. 
Id. 
24. See H.R. REP. No. 1444, supra note 23, at 4-5, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
at 4570 for a discussion of the criminal penalties structure. 
25. Id. For a more detailed description of this legislation see McLaughlin, supra 
note 4, at 568-71. 
26. See Kate Stith and Steve Y. Koh, The Politics ofSentencing Reform: The Legis­
lative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223 (1993) 
for a thorough discussion of the history leading up to the enactment of the Sentencing 
Refonn Act of 1984 which was title II of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. 
27. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 
(1984). Within this Act there are two chapters which this note discusses: Chapter Two­
Sentencing Refonn and Chapter Five-Drug Enforcement Amendments. 
28. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 3, at 1-2, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3184. 
29. The legislative history referred to the chapters as titles. See S. REP. No. 225, 
supra note 3, at III, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3183. 
30. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 3, at III, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3183. 
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1. Chapter Two-Sentencing Reform 
Chapter two, referred to as the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,31 
("SRA") established the United States Sentencing Commission32 
("Commission") and charged the Commission with the task of writing 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Through this Act, Congress in­
tended to provide honesty, uniformity, and proportionality in the sen­
tencing process. 33 Congress highlighted the importance of these goals 
by explicitly including them within title 18, section 3553 ofthe United 
States Code.34 
In the introduction to the Guidelines, the Commission defined 
honesty, uniformity, and proportionality. First, the Commission de­
termined that Congress "sought honesty in sentencing ... to avoid the 
confusion and implicit deception that arose out of the preguidelines 
sentencing system which required the court to impose an indetermi­
nate sentence of imprisonment and empowered the parole commission 
to determine how much of the sentence an offender actually would 
31. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473,98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codi­
fied as amended at 18 U.S.c. §§ 3551-3559, 3561-3566, 3571-3574, 3581-3586 (1988); 28 
U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988». 
32. 28 U.S.C. § 991 (1988). 
33. 28 U.S.C. §§ 991(b)(I)(B), 994(f) (1988). Specifically, Congress determined the 
following: 
A primary goal of sentencing reform is the elimination of unwarranted sentencing 
disparity. . .. The Committee does not intend that the guidelines be imposed in 
a mechanistic fashion. It believes that the sentencing judge has an obligation to 
consider all the relevant factors in a case. 
S. REP. No. 225, supra note 3 at 52, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3235-36 (footnotes 
omitted); see U.S.S.G. Ch.l, Pt.A. See also Kenneth R. Feinberg, Federal Criminal Sen­
tencing Reform: Congress and the United States Sentencing Commission, 28 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 291, 295 (1993) for a discussion of how "[t]he first and foremost goal of the sen­
tencing reform effort was to alleviate the perceived problem of federal criminal sentencing 
disparity. " 
34. 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a)(5)-(6) (1988). The pertinent sections state: 
(a) FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN IMPOSING A SENTENCE.-The court shall 
impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the 
purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection. The court, in determining 
the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider- .... 
(5) any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission pursu­
ant to 28 U.S.C. [§] 994(a)(2) that is in effect on the date the defendant is 
sentenced; 
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with 
similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct ... 
Id. See also, 28 U.S.C. §§ 991(b)(I)(B), 994(f) (1988) which specifically directed the Com­
mission to promulgate guidelines which provide honesty, uniformity, and proportionality 
in sentencing. 
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serve in prison."35 Second, the Commission found that "Congress 
sought reasonable uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the wide dis­
parity in sentences imposed for similar criminal offenses committed by 
similar offenders."36 Finally, the Commission determined that "Con­
gress sought proportionality in sentencing through a system that im­
poses appropriately different sentences for criminal conduct of 
differing severity."37 
The Guidelines restructured the manner in which the CSA sen­
tenced drug offenders and delineated a sentence for every possible 
drug, as well as precursor chemical ingredients for those drugs.38 The 
Guidelines provided a detailed drug table with increasing sentences 
based on the increasing weight of the drugs involved.39 Included in 
the drug tables, the Guidelines provided for sentences to be based on 
"mixtures" of drugs to be weighed to determine the drug offender's 
sentence. By providing for the weight of "mixtures" of drugs, the 
Commission incorporated the goals of honesty, uniformity, and pro­
portionality into the federal sentencing scheme.40 
The Guidelines, however, do not define the term "mixture," but 
instead refer the judge to title 21 section 841 of the United States Code 
for the definition.41 Unfortunately, Congress did not define "mixture" 
in section 841 or in any other federal statute. Therefore, a judge's only 
guidance is to define "mixture" in a manner that furthers the goals 
explicitly stated by Congress in the statute, namely honesty, uniform­
ity, and proportionality. 
2. Chapter Five-Drug Enforcement Amendments 
Chapter five, also known as the Controlled Substances Penalties 
Amendments Act of 198442 ("CSP AA"), focused on correcting the 
35. U.S.S.G. Ch.l, Pt.A (n.3). 
36. Id. 
37. Id. See William w. Wilkins, Jr., The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Striking an 
Appropriate Balance, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 571 (1992) for a discussion of how the Com­
mission sought to balance the goals of uniformity and proportionality. 
38. U.S.S.G. § 201.1 has a drug quantity table which categorizes the amount of 
drugs the convicted defendant possessed into a base offense level. Once a sentencing judge 
determines the base level offense, he or she will then tum to U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt.A to deter­
mine the specific sentencing range. 
39. See Honorable Bruce M. Selya and Matthew R. Kipp, An Examination 0/ 
Emerging Departure Jurisprudence Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 67 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1,3-13 (1991) for a discussion of the Guidelines and how a judge calculates 
a drug offenders sentence. 
40. See supra note 33. 
41. See U.S.S.G. § 201.1, comment. (n.I). 
42. Controlled Substances Penalties Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 
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inadequacies of the CSA in punishing illicit drug trafficking.43 Con­
gress noted that drug trafficking was one of the most serious problems 
faced by this country and the CSP AA focused on three areas.44 First, 
Congress shifted the basis of sentencing away from the classification of 
the drug and concentrated on the quantities of drugs involved.45 Sec­
ond, by increasing the small statutory fine limits, Congress hoped to 
deter major drug traffickers with high incomes.46 Finally, the CSPAA 
eliminated any reference to a drug as being narcotic or nonnarcotic, as 
this classification failed to reflect the severity of such potent drugs as 
PCP, LSD and methamphetamine, all of which were labelled 
nonnarcotic.47 
In continuing with the CSP AA's focus on drug dealers, Congress 
enacted the Narcotics Penalties and Enforcement Act of 1986 
("NPEA"). Congress consulted with drug enforcement agents and 
federal prosecutors to amend the CSP AA to more severely punish the 
major drug traffickers.48 In referring to the "mixture" in the legisla­
tive history of NPEA, Congress said that "mixture" did not necessar­
ily mean the pure drug. Instead, Congress coined the phrase "market­
oriented approach"49 which focused on the weight of the diluted form 
98 Stat. 2068 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 802, 811, 812, 822-24, 827, 841, 
843, 845, 845a, 873, 881, 952, 953, 957, 958, 960, 962 (1988». This Act is chapter five of 
the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L.No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984). 
43. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 3, at 255, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3437. 
Specifically, Congress stated the following: 
The purpose of [the CSPAA] is to provide a more rational penalty structure for 
the major drug trafficking offenses punishable under the Comprehensive Drug 
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (21 U.S.C. 801 etseq.). Illicit traffick­
ing in drugs is one of the most serious crime problems facing the county, yet the 




46. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 3, at 255-56, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
3437-38. 
47. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 3, "at 256, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3438. 
48. H.R. REP. No. 845, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I at 11-12 (1986). But see Joseph 
B. Treaster, Two Judges Decline Drug Cases, Protesting Sentencing Rules, N.Y. TIMES, 
April 17, 1993, at I, which describes how two judges, Jack B. Weinstein of Brooklyn and 
Whitman Knapp of Manhattan, joined about 50 out of the 680 Federal district judges in 
refusing to take drug cases. The two judges, who are senior judges and have more latitude 
in choosing their cases, are protesting the national drug policies and Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines as being unfair and overly cruel. They state that the sentencing rules have done 
nothing more than load up the prisons and have not improved the drug situation. See also 
Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake a/Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the 
Discretion o/Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681 (1992) for an"in-depth look at the Guidelines 
and the problems associated with them. 
49. H.R. REP. No. 845, supra note 48, at 12 said: 
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of the drug as it reached the ultimate user market. 50 Furthermore, 
this approach not only severely affected the major drug traffickers, but 
also the retail level dealer who kept the street markets going.51 Thus, 
all convicted drug offenders would be punished based on the weight of 
the pure drug plus any cutting agents 52 or additives instead of on the 
weight of the pure drug alone.53 Unfortunately, the legislative history 
of the NPEA provided only a brief and albeit, confusing explanation 
as to why Congress decided to alter the sentencing scheme in this 
fashion. 
The goals of the SRA, which is the authority for the Guidelines, 
and those of the CSP AA and the NPEA are not necessarily consistent. 
The goals ofthe SRA strived for honesty, uniformity, and proportion­
ality.54 The goals of the CSP AA and the NPEA provided for a harsh, 
severe penalty scheme focused on major drug dealers. 55 When sen­
tencing a drug offender today, a judge must look to both the Guide­
lines and the drug statutes, as amended by the CSP AA and the 
NPEA, which both contain the word "mixture." 
When construing the word "mixture," these two goals might 
seem to be in conflict. For example, in United States v. Mahecha­
Onofre,56 the defendant had chemically combined 2.5 kilograms of co­
caine with the fabric of a suitcase. 57 The judge perhaps furthered the 
goals of the CSP AA and the NPEA by weighing the cocaine and the 
suitcase together; however, the goals of the SRA arguably were not 
The Committee's statement of quantities is of mixtures, compounds or prepara­
tions that contain a detectable amount of the drug-these are not necessarily 
quantities of pure substance. One result of this market-oriented approach is that 
the Committee has not generally related these quantities to the number of doses of 
the drug that might be present in a given sample. The quantity is based on the 
minimum quantity that might be controlled or directed by a trafficker in a high 
place in the processing and distribution chain. 
Id. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 11-12. See also Chapman v. United States, III S. Ct. 1919, 1925 (1991) 
which interprets Congress' legislative history. 
52. A "cutting agent" is a product which is mixed with the drug to dilute its 
strength. See supra note 4. 
53. H.R. REP. No. 845, supra note 48, at 11-12. The exact language of the Commit­
tee report said that "[t]he Committee strongly believes that the Federal government's most 
intense focus ought to be on major traffickers, the manufacturers or the heads of organiza­
tions, who are responsible for creating and delivering very large quantities of drugs." Id. 
54. See supra notes 31-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of the goals of the 
Sentencing Reform Act. 
55. See supra notes 42-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of the goals of the 
CSPAA and the NPEA. 
56. 936 F.2d 623 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 648 (1991). 
57. Id. at 624. 
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furthered because only the 2.5 kilograms of cocaine would reach the 
market and therefore the defendant's sentence was disproportionate to 
any other dealer distributing the same amount of cocaine.58 
The Supreme Court faced a similar "mixture" problem in Chap­
man v. United States. 59 Although Chapman dealt only with the inclu­
sion of blotter paper "mixed" with the drug LSD, the Court examined 
three factors that can be applied to any drug "mixture" problem to 
reconcile the goals of the SRA, the CSPAA, and the NPEA. Section 
B discusses the District Court, Court of Appeals and Supreme Court 
decisions in Chapman v. United States. 
B. 	 Chapman v. United States60 
The Supreme Court defined the term "mixture" in Chapman. In 
this case, three defendants were each convicted under title 21 section 
841 of the United States Code61 for selling ten sheets (toOO doses) of 
blotter paper containing LSD.62 The LSD alone weighed approxi­
mately 50 milligrams, while the combined weight of the blotter paper 
and LSD weighed 5,700 milligrams.63 The case presented the issue of 
whether the weight of the blotter paper should be included with the 
weight of the drug. 
1. 	 United States District Court for the Central District of 
Illinois 
The district court, in United States v. Marshal/,M rejected the de­
fendants' argument that the blotter paper was merely a container hold­
58. The combined weight of the suitcase and the cocaine was 12 kilograms which 
resulted in a sentence of 146 months. If the judge had sentenced the defendant based on 
the weight of the cocaine only (2.5 kilograms), the sentencing range would have only been 
between 78 and 97 months. 
59. 	 III S. Ct. 1919 (1991). 
60. 	 Id. 
61. 	 Defendants violated 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1988) which states the following: 
(a) Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person 
knowingly or intentionally-(l) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or pos­
sess with intent to manufacture, dispense, a controlled substance; or (2) to create, 
distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to distribute or dispense, a counter­
feit substance. 
Id. 
62. 	 Chapman, III S. Ct. at 1922. 
63. 	 Id. 
64. 706 F. Supp. 650 (C.D. Ill. 1989), affd, 908 F.2d 1312 (7th Cir. 1990), affd sub 
nom., Chapman v. United States, III S. Ct. 1919 (1991). This case became Chapman v. 
United States on appeal because Marshall, the named defendant, did not appeal his sen­
tence. Instead, only one of the defendants, Richard Chapman, appealed to the Supreme 
Court. 
1993] CRIMINAL LAW-SIFTING THROUGH THE "MIXTURE" PROBLEM 405 

ing a dose of LSD and should not be included in the weight of the drug 
for sentencing PUrposes.65 The court concluded that the combined 
weight of the blotter paper and LSD must be used to calculate the 
defendants' sentences.66 Consequently, the judge sentenced the de­
fendants to a minimum five year mandatory term.67 If the judge had 
considered only the weight of the LSD alone, the Guidelines would 
have required only an eighteen month sentence. 68 
The district court noted that since LSD was too potent to be con­
sumed in its pure form it had to be mixed with an alcohol solution. 69 
Because the alcohol solution had a tendency to evaporate, the alcohol! 
LSD mixture had to be sprayed onto a carrier-like paper in order to be 
consumed.70 The user would then eat the paper or lick the LSD off 
the paper. 71 The defendant argued that absurd sentences would result 
if the blotter paper was included with the weight of the drug. 72 The 
court rejected this argument because the defendant did not assert that 
his blotter paper was heavier or different from blotter paper normally 
used in the LSD drug trade. Thus, the issue of possible absurd 
sentences simply did not apply to this case.73 
The court examined the plain language of the statute and found 
no ambiguity.74 The court noted that although Congress included the 
word "mixture" for a judge sentencing a defendant with LSD, in the 
case of the drug phencyclidine (PCP), Congress allowed a judge to 
sentence a defendant based on either the pure drug PCP or a "mix­
ture" including a detectable amount of PCP." Thus, the court con­
65. Id. at 654. 
66. Id. 
67. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(I)(B)(v) (1988). The pertinent part states: 
(B) In case of a violation of subsection (a) of this section involving ... 
(v) 1 gram or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of 
lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD); 
such persons shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be less 
than 5 years and not more than 40 years . . . . 
Id. 
68. When calculating the defendant's sentence under the Guidelines based on the 
weight of the pure drug only, his base offense level was 14 which resulted in a sentencing 
range of 15-21 months. See U.S.S.G. § 2DLl and Ch.5, Pt.A. 
69. Marshall, 706 F. Supp. at 652. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. The defendant argued that if one "hit" of acid was on a heavy cardboard, it 
would create a harsher penalty than many hits of acid on a tissue paper. Id. 
73. Id. at 653. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. For example, if a defendant was sentenced for PCP, the judge would refer to 
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(I)(A)(iv) (1988) which provided "100 grams or more of phencyclidine 
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cluded that because Congress did not provide for the same discretion 
with LSD, it must have intended to include the weight of the paper for 
sentencing purposes. 76 
2. United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district 
court's sentence and its interpretation of the word "mixture."77 The 
court further noted that although the blotter paper and LSD might 
not technically be a "mixture," this was irrelevant because the combi­
nation of blotter paper and LSD was the ordinary usage of the drug. 78 
As with cocaine, ordinary "mixtures" i.ncluded white powders such as 
mannitol, quinine or lactose because those substances were the usual 
cutting agents for that drug.79 Thus, the court looked to the ordinary 
"mixture" of a drug to determine a statutory "mixture. "80 
The Court of Appeals then addressed the defendants' argument 
that inclusion of the blotter paper resulted in nonuniform sentences 
and thus was unconstitutional,81 In rejecting this argument, the court 
held that the Constitution did not require a uniform sentence. Rather, 
the Constitution only required that a sentence bear a rational relation­
ship to the offense. Moreover, Congress did have a rational basis for 
sentencing defendants based on the gross weight of the drug.82 Thus, 
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision to 
include the weight of the blotter paper in the total weight of the drug 
for sentencing purposes. 
(PCP) or I kilogram or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of 
phencyclidine (PCP)." A conviction of possession of either the pure 100 grams or the I kg 
mixture containing PCP would result in a sentence of 10 years to life. Marshall, 706 F. 
Supp. at 653. 
A 1990 amendment to 21 U.S.c. § 84l(b)(I)(A)(viii) (1988 & Supp. II 1990) required 
methamphetamine to be weighed either by its pure weight or by its "mixture" of the pure 
methamphetamine plus any additives, just like PCP. When the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit analyzed this statute, only PCP drug offenders could have their sentences 
determined by the pure weight of PCP without any additives. 
76. Marshall, 706 F. Supp. at 653. The court found that Congress was aware that 
the sentencing scheme might not have always referred to the number of doses but that 
Congress instead focused on drug traffickers that dealt with a large quantity of drugs. Id. 
(referring to H.R. REP. No. 845, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 at 12 (1986)). 
77. United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312 (7th Cir. 1990), a./J'd sub nom., Chap­
man v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1919 (1991). 
78. Id. at 1317. 
79. Id. 
80. [d. 
81. Id. at 1324. 
82. Id. 
1993] CRIMINAL LAW-SIFl'ING THROUGH THE "MIXTURE" PROBLEM 407 
3. United States Supreme Court Majority Opinion 
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' holdings that the 
Guidelines and the NPEA83 required that the weight of the carrier 
medium (blotter paper) be included with the LSD when determining 
the defendant's sentence.84 The majority analyzed three factors to de­
termine whether the blotter paper should be included with the weight 
of the LSD.8s One factor was whether the term "mixture" in its ordi­
nary usage would include the blotter paper. The Court noted that 
neither Congress nor the common law had previously defined the 
term. 86 
A "mixture" is defined to include "a portion of matter consisting of 
two or more components that do not bear a fixed proportion to one 
another and that however thoroughly commingled are regarded as 
retaining a separate existence." A "mixture" may also consist of 
two substances blended together so that the particles of one are dif­
fused among the particles of the other.87 
The Court concluded that the LSD and the blotter paper fell within 
that definition. 
LSD is applied to the blotter paper in a solvent, which is absorbed 
into the paper and ultimately evaporates. After the solvent evapo­
rates, the LSD is left behind in a form that can be said to "mix" 
with the paper. The LSD crystals are inside the paper, so that they 
are commingled with it, but the LSD does not chemically combine 
with the paper . . . . The LSD is diffused among the fibers of the 
paper. Like heroin or cocaine mixed with cutting agents, the LSD 
cannot be distinguished from the blotter paper, nor easily separated 
from it.88 
83. Narcotics Penalties and Enforcement Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 
3207-2 (1986) (codified as amended at, 21 U.S.C. §§ 802, 841, 845, 845a, 848, 881, 960, 962 
(1988); 18 U.S.c. §§ 3553, 3583 (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 994 (1988); FED. R. CRIM. P. 35). 
This Act is Subtitle A of Title I of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 
100 Stat. 3207 (1986). 
84. Chapman v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1919, 1929 (1991). The Supreme Court 
specifically restricted its holding in this case to LSD and blotter paper. Id. This is evi­
denced in the holding itself, where the Court specifically refers to "the" carrier medium 
rather than "a" or "any" carrier medium. 
85. For clarification purposes, I have reorganized the way the Supreme Court dis­
cussed the three factors. 
86. Chapman, 111 S. Ct. at 1925; see 21 U.S.c. § 802 (1988, Supp. II 1990 & Supp. 
III 1991). In the definition section to the statute Congress did not define "mixture." 
87. Chapman, 111 S. Ct. at 1926 (citations omitted) (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD 
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1449 (1986) and citing 9 OXFORD ENGLISH DIC­
TIONARY 921 (2d ed. 1989». 
88. Id. 
408 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:395 
The second factor considered was whether the blotter paper was 
ingestible. The Court noted that a user will either lick the paper or eat 
it in order to ingest the drug.89 The Court also distinguished blotter 
paper from a container because blotter paper was ingestible and a 
container was not. The Court concluded that containers are not in­
gestible and would not be included in the weight of the drug for sen­
tencing purposes.9O 
The third factor was congressional intent. The Court noted that 
in 1984 Congress called for a more rational approach to sentencing 
convicted drug traffickers.91 The Court found that Congress restruc­
tured the penalties for drug distribution with a "market-oriented" ap­
proach.92 This new approach required a judge to sentence convicted 
drug offenders according to the total weight of the pure drug plus any 
additives that normally would be distributed to the retail customer.93 
The Court also determined that Congress intended "the penalties for 
drug trafficking to be graduated according to the weight of the drugs 
in whatever form they were found--cut or uncut, pure or unpure, 
ready for wholesale or [retail] distribution."94 Thus, the Court con­
cluded that including the weight of the blotter paper effectuated the 
goal of Congress' "market-oriented" approach.95 
In summary, the Chapman decision found the LSD and blotter 
paper to be a "mixture" based on three criteria. First, the Court deter­
mined that LSD and the blotter paper constituted a "mixture" within 
the dictionary meaning.96 Second, Chapman found that the LSD and 
blotter paper combination was an ingestible "mixture."91 Finally, the 
Court examined Congress' legislative history and found that the LSD 
and blotter paper "mixture" fit within Congress' "market-oriented" 
approach.98 
89. Id. at 1923. 
90. Id. at 1926. 
91. Id. at 1925 (referring to S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 255 (1983), re­
printed in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3437). 





96. Id. at 1926. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 1925, 1927. 
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4. United States Supreme Court Dissenting Opinion99 
The dissent in Chapman called the majority's decision "bi­
zarre"loo and said that the majority's construction of title 21 section 
841 of the United States Code completely undermined Congress' ulti­
mate goal of uniformity. 101 The dissent focused its argument on two 
points: (1) the lack of clarity in the statute lO2 and (2) the fact that the 
majority's definition of "mixture" was contrary to the legislative 
history. 103 
First, the dissenters determined that the statute was unclear be­
cause of the subsequent legislative history of the NPEA.I04 Specifi­
cally, the dissent noted that in 1989, both Senator Biden and Senator 
Kennedy tried to clarify the definition of "mixture." lOS Both Senators 
presented legislation that would have excluded carrier mediums from 
the "mixture" definition.l06 Congress, however, never adopted the 
legislation as law. Thus, the dissent argued, that "[a]1though such 
subsequent legislation must be approached with circumspection be­
99. Justice Stevens and Justice Marshall both dissented from the majority opinion. 
100. Chapman, 111 S. Ct. at 1929 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
101. Id. 
102. Id. at 1931. 
103. Id. at 1933-34. 
104. Id. at 1930-31. The dissent noted, however, that "[o]f course subsequent legis­
lative history is generally not relevant and always must be used with care in interpreting 
enacted legislation. It can, however, provide evidence that an effect of a statute was simply 
overlooked." Id. at 1931 n.7 (citations omitted). 
105. Id. at 1931. Senator Biden wrote a letter dated April 26, 1989 to the Chairman 
of the Sentencing Commission, William W. Wilkens, Jr. The relevant portion of the letter 
said: 
"With respect to LSD, it is unclear whether Congress intended the carrier to be 
considered as a packaging material, or, since it is commonly consumed along with 
the illicit drug, as a dilutant ingredient in the drug mixture. . .. The Commission 
suggests that Congress may wish to further consider the LSD carrier issue in 
order to clarify legislative intent as to whether the weight of the carrier should or 
should not be considered in determining the quantity of LSD mixture for punish­
ment purposes." 
Id. (quoting United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1327-28 (7th Cir. 1990), ajJ'd sub 
nom., Chapman v. United States, III S. Ct. 1919 (1991». Senator Biden then offered an 
amendment to correct the inequity. His amendment was adopted as part of Amendment 
No. 976 to S.1711, but the bill never passed the House of Representatives. Id. Senator 
Kennedy proposed an amendment as follows: 
"Section 841(b)(1) of title 21, United States Code, is amended by inserting the 
following new subsection at the end thereof: "[sic]'(E) In determining the weight 
of a mixture or substance under this section, the court shall not include the 
weight of the carrier upon which the controlled substance is placed, or by which 
it is transported.' " 
Id. (quoting 136 CONGo REC. S7069-70 (daily ed. May 24, 1990». 
106. Id. 
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cause it can neither clarify what the enacting Congress had contem­
plated nor speak to whether the clarifications will ever be passed, the 
amendments, at the very least, indicate that the language of the statute 
is far from clear or plain" as the majority seemed to suggest. 107 
Second, the dissenters noted that although Congress intended to 
punish drug traffickers severely, Congress also intended to punish drug 
traffickers who sell larger quantities of drugs more severely than those 
selling smaller quantities. 108 This would suggest that the majority's 
construction of "mixture" 
would punish more severely those who sell small quanitities of LSD 
in weighty carriers, and instead of sentencing in comparable ways 
those who sell different types of drugs, the Court would sentence 
those who sell LSD to longer terms than those who sell proportion­
ately equivalent quantities of other equally dangerous drugs. The 
Court today shows little respect for Congress' handiwork when it 
construes a statute to undermine the very goals that Congress 
sought to achieve. 109 
The dissent pointed out that not including the carrier medium 
(blotter paper) would lead to more uniform results because the same 
amount of drugs still reached the market regardless of the weight of 
the "carrier medium."llo They argued that since LSD is sold in doses, 
the medium on which it is placed would not increase the amount of 
drugs being trafficked to the user market. II I 
II. PRINCIPAL CASES 
After the Chapman decision, the United States courts of appeals 
reached different results on the issue of whether a chemically com­
bined container should be included in the calculation of the weight of 
107. Id. at 1931. 
108. Id. at 1933 (citing H.R. REP. No. 845, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 at 11-12 
(1986». 
109. Id. at 1934 (footnotes omitted). 
110. Id. at 1933. The majority included a table to show the sentencing variation 
with the different carrier mediums. Id. at 1924. The table is as follows: 
Weight of Base Offense Guideline 
Carrier 100 Doses Level Range (months) 
Sugar Cube 227 gr 36 188-235 
Blotter Paper 1.4 gr 26 63-78 
Gelatin capsule 225 mg 18 27-33 
Pure [) LSD 5 mg 12 10-16 
Id. (citing Brief for Petitioners). 
111. Id. at 1933. 
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drugs for sentencing. To date, the Courts of Appeals for the Second, 
Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that a "mixture" 
should include only the drug and any "usable" additives when deter­
mining the total weight of a drug for sentencing purposes.112 How­
ever, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has held that any 
"mixture" must be included in determining the total weight of a drug, 
regardless of whether the additives are usable. 113 Conflicting results 
occurred in the various circuits due to each court's emphasis on the 
different Congressional goals and each court's attempt to distinguish 
or follow the Chapman decision. In distinguishing or following Chap­
man, each court has placed a different emphasis on each of the Chap­
man factors: mixture, ingestibility, and marketability. 
A. United States Court ofAppeals for the Second Circuit 
In United States v. Acosta,1l4 the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit focused on Chapman's marketability factor. In Acosta, a de­
fendant imported cocaine dissolved in creme liqueur. I IS The court did 
not inClude the creme liqueur with the weight of the cocaine for sen­
tencing. The cocaine without the liqueur weighed 2.245 kilograms 
which resulted in a sentencing range of 41-51 months. 116 The cocaine 
with the liqueur weighed 4.662 kilograms and would have resulted in a 
sentencing range of 51-63 months.l17 
112. See supra note 10. 
113. This section will only discuss the First, Second, and Ninth Circuit opinions 
because the other court opinions are based on similar fact patterns. For instance, both the 
Second Circuit and Eleventh Circuit addressed alcohol and cocaine mixtures and both 
courts concluded that the alcohol should not be weighed with the drug for sentencing pur­
poses. The Third Circuit reached a sirniliar conclusion as the Ninth Circuit. Both courts 
determined that the brick in which the drug dealer tried to trick the buyer into thinking 
was cocaine should not be weighed for sentencing purposes. See infra note 122 for a discus­
sion of the Eleventh Circuit opinion and infra note 130 for a discussion of the Third Circuit 
opinion. 
114. 963 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1992). 
115. Id. at 552. 
116. Id. The sentencing court imposed a sentence of 51 months. The Second Circuit 
footnoted the following explanation: 
We note that the 51 month sentence imposed falls within the overlap of the two 
possibly applicable guideline ranges. We have held that when a sentence falls 
within the overlap and the sentencing judge makes clear that the same sentence 
would be imposed regardless of which of the two guideline ranges is applicable, 
we will not engage in the metaphysics of determining which is the appropriate 
range .... Here, the record is clear that Judge Glasser would have imposed a 
sentence less than 51 months had he believed the lower range was applicable, and, 
therefore, we address defendant's claim of error. 
Id. at 553 n.2 (citations omitted). 
117. Id. 
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The court noted that the cocaine would have to be distilled out of 
the liqueur before distribution and that the liqueur, as even the gov­
ernment conceded, was merely a mask to conceal the cocaine. The 
court further noted that the government did not contest the defend­
ant's argument that the creme liqueur was not ingestible. liS The ma­
jority found these factors to be important because if the liqueur was 
only a mask and the cocaine had to be distilled out of the liqueur 
before use, then the creme liqueur could be considered "unusable."119 
The court reasoned that even though the cocaine and creme liqueur 
were technically a "mixture," the cocaine would have been extracted 
from the liqueur before being distributed to the market; therefore, 
"there [was] no reason to base a sentence on the entire weight of a 
useless mixture."12o 
Furthermore, the majority determined that since Congress in­
tended to create a "market-oriented" approach in the NPEA, the cul­
pability of the defendant in Acosta was identical to individuals who did 
not conceal the drug in liqueur. Essentially, the same amount of drugs 
would reach the retail market. Thus, the court asserted that including 
the liqueur for sentencing purposes would violate the Guidelines' call 
for "uniformity and proportionality in sentencing." 121 Finally, the 
Acosta court noted that its holding only applied to uningestible "mix­
tures." This holding would not apply to ingestible "mixtures" that 
contained cutting agents or dilutants. 122 
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Van Graafeiland asserted that he 
believed that the majority inappropriately legislated and reached a re­
sult that was legally and factually incorrect. 123 First, Judge Van 
Graafeiland said that the Government had not conceded that the co­
118. Id. See infra notes 123-28 and accompanying text for the dissent's discussion 
on how the majority came to the wrong conclusion of whether the creme liqueur was 
"usuable. " 
119. Id. at 553. 
120. Id. at 555. 
121. Id. at 554. 
122. Id. at 556. The Eleventh Circuit was faced with the identical issue in United 
States v. Rolande-Gabriel, 938 F.2d 1231 (11th Cir. 1991). In that case, the defendant was 
convicted of importing cocaine into the country by dissolving it into a liquid substance. Id. 
at 1232. However, in Rolande-Gabriel, the court did not discuss whether the liquid sub­
stance was usable. 
Rather, it merely stated that the liquid substance was not usable. Id. at 1233. The 
court then stated that since the liquid substance was not usable, it was not includable in the 
weight of the drug. Id. at 1238. The court cited Chapman in support of this contention, 
stating that the distinction between whether a substance is usable or not determines 
whether to include the substance in the total weight under the Federal Sentencing Guide­
lines. Id. at 1236-38. 
123. Acosta, 963 F.2d at 557 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting). 
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caine could not be distributed in its mixed form with the liqueur. 124 
Judge Van Graafeiland noted that the majority, and not the defend­
ant's counsel, asserted that the "mixture" was not ingestible. 12s Judge 
Van Graafeiland contended that the "mixture" of the liqueur and co­
caine was ingestible and referred to drinks such as Vin Mariani and 
Coca Cola that contained cocaine at one time. 
Second, Judge Van Graafeiland pointed out that the majority's 
focus on distribution to the user market was incorrect. Acosta was 
convicted of importing, rather than distributing, the cocaine; thus, the 
majority's discussion of marketability and distribution to the user mar­
ket was wrong and irrelevant. 126 Furthermore, even if distribution 
mattered, the court would still include the creme liqueur because 
Acosta was a drug dealer. Thus, the dissent concluded that the court 
should include the liqueur with the weight of the cocaine because Con­
gress intended to impose a harsh sentence on drug dealers by including 
all "mixtures," without exception. 127 The dissent also concluded that 
124. Id. 
125. Id. at 558. Judge Van Graafeiland said that 

[m]y colleagues' assertion that the Government "does not contest the defendant's 

argument that the creme liqueur was not ingestible" also is wide of the mark. 

[Acosta's] brief contains no mention whatever of lack of ingestibility. To the ex­

tent that there was any argument against ingestibility, it was my colleagues, not 

[Acosta's] counsel, who made it, and a poor argument it was. 

Id. 
126. Id. Judge Van Graafeiland takes issue with the majority's focus on the distri­
bution aspect of the drugs. The dissent quotes the Ninth Circuit which stated, "[o]ur ex­
amination of the statute and its history underscores the strong congressional intent to 
criminalize all aspects of drug trafficking, and it compels us to reject an approach which 
focuses on sales or commercial transactions." Id. at 557 (quoting United States v. Palafox, 
764 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1985». Thus, Judge Van Graafeiland determines that just 
because Acosta may not intend the "mixture" to reach the ultimate user market, this 
should not affect his sentence. 
127. Judge Van Graafeiland also rejects the majority's reliance on uniformity and 
proportional sentencing. Id. at 560. He says that the uniformity and proportional princi­
ple were rejected by the Chapman Court and that it also has been rejected by numerous 
other courts. Id. (citing Chapman v. United States, III S. Ct. 1919, 1927-29 (1991)). He 
cites the following cases for support: United States v. Bishop, 894 F.2d 981, 985-96 (8th 
Cir.), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 106 (1990); United States v. Klein, 860 F.2d 1489, 1500-01 
(9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Whitehead, 849 F.2d 849, 859-60 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
488 U.S. 983 (1988); United States v. Holmes, 838 F.2d 1175, 1177-78 (11th Cir.), cerro 
denied, 486 U.S. 1058 (1988). 
However, Chapman never explicitly rejected the uniformity and proportionality prin­
ciples. See supra notes 83-98 and accompanying text for the Chapman discussion. See also 
supra notes 19-41 and accompanying text for the discussion of the drug statutes which 
support the conclusion that Congress explicitly called for sentencing to remain uniform and 
proportional. Furthermore, the Supreme Court just recently decided that the commentary 
within the Guidelines is binding on the sentencing court. Stinson v. United States, 113 S. 
Ct. 1913 (1993). Specifically, the Court stated the following: "[w]e decide that commen­
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the defendant was the kind of drug trafficker that Congress had re­
ferred to in creating the "market-oriented" approach.!28 
B. United States Court ofAppeals for the Ninth Circuit 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United States v. 
Robins!29 focused on the Chapman Court's ingestibility factor and 
concluded that cornmeal in which cocaine was stored should not be 
included in determining the total weight of cocaine for sentencing. 130 
In Robins, the defendant tried to trick the buyer into thinking that 
bricks of cornmeal wrapped in duct tape were actually solid co­
caine.!3! The defendant made V-shaped cuts into the bricks of corn­
meal and poured the cocaine into the notches.!32 When the buyer 
wanted to test the cocaine, the defendant punched holes in the bricks 
of cornmeal where the V -shaped notches contained the cocaine.133 
In reaching its conclusion that the weight of the cornmeal should 
not be included in the weight of the cocaine, the court first noted that 
the cornmeal had to be separated from the cocaine before the cocaine 
could be consumed. The court made this determination because a fo­
rensic toxicologist testified that cornmeal was not a carrier medium 134 
or a cutting agent13S of cocaine. The court thus found that the corn­
meal was more like a packaging material, which had been explicitly 
excluded from consideration in the Chapman decision. 136 
tary in the Guidelines Manual that interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless 
it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly errone­
ous reading of, that guideline." Id. at 1915. Thus, the introduction to the Guidelines, 
which requires that the interpretation of the Guidelines must be done so as to further the 
goals of honesty, uniformity, and proportionality, is binding on the courts. 
128. Acosta, 963 F.2d at 560. 
129. 967 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir. 1992). 
130. Id. at 1390-91. The Third Circuit was faced with a very similar issue in United 
States v. Rodriguez, 975 F.2d 999 (3d Cir. 1992). In that case, DEA agents seized pack­
ages of cocaine containing 2976 grams of boric acid and 65.1 grams of cocaine. Id. at 1001. 
The packages were made up of a compressed block of boric acid with a thin layer of cocaine 
spread on the surface. Id. The packages were constructed this way in an elfort to trick 
unsuspecting customers into thinking that the whole brick was cocaine. Id. The court held 
that the boric acid should not be weighed along with the cocaine because the two sub­
stances were not mixed together. Id. at 1004-05. The court also determined that the boric 
acid was not used or intended to be a cutting agent. Id. at 1005. Thus, the court concluded 
that only the cocaine and not the.boric acid should be weighed. Id. at 1007. 
131. Robins, 967 F.2d at 1389. 
132. Id. at 1388. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 1389; see supra note 12. 
135. Robins, 967 F.2d at 1389; see supra note 4. 
136. Robins, 967 F.2d at 1389 (referring to Chapman v. United States, III S. Ct. 
1919, 1925-28 (1991». 
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Second, the court determined that the cornmeal and cocaine were 
not a "mixture."137 Since the cocaine was easily distinguished from 
the cornmeal and the cornmeal was not used as a cutting agent, there 
was no "mixture" of the two substances. 138 Rather, the court con­
cluded that the sole purpose of the cornmeal was to trick the buyer 
into thinking that the brick was made entirely of cocaine. 139 
Finally, the Robins court distinguished its prior holding in United 
States v. Chan Yu-Chong. l40 The court noted that in Chan Yu-Chong, 
the defendants were sentenced based on the total weight of heroin 
combined with an unidentified substance, which was most likely tal­
cum powder. 141 There was no evidence in Chan Yu-Chong " 'that the 
unidentified substance was not consumable by the ultimate user, e.g., 
that it was poisonous or that it would not dissolve as necessary for its 
ultimate injection.' "142 Thus, the Chan Yu-Chong court held that the 
heroin and talcum powder were a "mixture."143 In Robins, however, 
the court determined that since the cornmeal was not ingestible,l44 nor 
actually mixed with the cocaine, the cornmeal should not be included 
with the weight of the drugs for sentencing purposes. 
C. United States Court ofAppeals for the First Circuit 
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in United States v. 
Mahecha-Onofre,14s focused on the Chapman Court's definition of 
137. Id. 
138. Id. The cornmeal was easily distinguished because the cornmeal was yellow 
and the cocaine was white. The defendant also produced testimony by a forensic toxicolo­
gist who testified that cornmeal was not a carrier medium or a cutting agent of cocaine. 
139. Id. at 1391. 
140. Id. at 1390; see also United States v. Chan Yu-Chong, 920 F.2d 594 (9th Cir. 
1990). 
141. Robins, 967 F.2d at 1390. In Chan Yu-Chong, 920 F.2d at 596, the unidentified 
substance weighed 1920 grams while the heroin weighed 82.4 grams. 
142. Robins, 967 F.2d at 1390 (quoting Chan Yu-Chong, 920 F.2d at 597). 
143. Id. 
144. Id. Specifically, the Robins court said: 
Although cornmeal is consumable ... it cannot reasonably be argued that Robins 
used the cornmeal to dilute the cocaine because the undisputed facts show that 
the sole purpose of the cocaine was to mask the identity of the cornmeal. Robins 
intended to pass off the cornmeal as cocaine by salting the mine in the area of the 
V-shaped cuts. 
Id. The court also found that "[t]he cornmeal had to be separated from the cocaine before 
the cocaine could be effectively used." Id. at 1389. 
145. 936 F.2d 623 (Ist. Cir.), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 648 (1991). Two other First 
Circuit cases which address the "mixture" problem are United States v. Restrepo-Con­
treras, 942 F.2d 96 (Ist Cir. 1991) (ruling that cocaine mixed with beeswax should be 
weighed together) and United States v. Lopez-Gil, 965 F.2d 1124 (1st Cir.) (affirming 
United States v. Mahecha-Onofre by holding that the weight of the suitcase should be in­
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"mixture" to conclude that where cocaine was chemically combined 
with the fabric of a suitcase, the weight of the suitcase was properly 
added to the weight of the cocaine for sentencing purposes. The First 
Circuit concluded that Chapman stood for the proposition that any 
"mixture" that has a detectable amount of drugs in it must be included 
in the total weight of the drug mixture. The court focused on Chap­
man's definition of "mixture" and held that cocaine which was chemi­
cally bonded to an acrylic suitcase was a "mixture," and therefore, the 
total weight must be included for sentencing under the NPEA and the 
Guidelines. 146 Further, the court reasoned that although the suitcase 
could not be consumed, the Chapman Court's discussion of inges­
tibility was unimportant to the outcome of Chapman and thus, inges­
tibility did not "playa critical role in the definition of 'mixture.' "147 
The court explained that Congress considered not only the type of the 
drug but also the weight to be important, and thus, both should be 
considered when sentencing. 148 The court did not discuss or attempt 
to distinguish the marketability factor. The Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit concluded that the chemically combined container must 
be included with the weight of the drug for sentencing purposes. 
Conversely, the Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, Ninth, 
and Eleventh Circuits, concluded that the chemically combined con­
tainers should not be included with the weight of the drug for sentenc­
ing. 149 Much of this confusion resulted from the various 
interpretations of the Chapman ISO decision. In Chapman, the 
Supreme Court discussed three factors, but did not give any guidance 
as to how these factors should be applied when dealing with a "mix­
ture" other than LSD and blotter paper. lSI As a result, each subse­
quent lower court opinion gave greater weight to the factors it 
determined were important and either attempted to distinguish the 
other factors or did not address them at all. ls2 The solution to this 
eluded with the weight of the cocaine because the two substances were chemically com­
bined into a "mixture"), cert. dismissed, 112 S. Ct. 2959, cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 484 (1992). 
146. Mahecha-Onofre, 936 F.2d at 625-26 (referring to Chapman V. United States, 
111 S. Ct. 1919, 1926 (1991)). 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
149. See supra note 10. 
150. Chapman v. United States, IlJ S. Ct. 1919 (1991). 
151. See supra notes 83-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of the United 
States Supreme Court opinion. 
152. See supra notes 114-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of the circuit 
court opinions. 
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"mixture" problem is to create a consistent test that will incorporate 
Congress' intent for both the NPEA and the Guidelines. 
III. ANALYSIS 
The Supreme Court's factors in Chapman v. United States lS3 can 
be used by the lower federal courts to further Congress' intent to pro­
vide honesty, uniformity, and proportionalitylS4 while also providing 
severe sentences for drug offenders. I ss Congress has the responsibility 
for defining "mixture" so that courts can sentence convicted drug of­
fenders appropriately.ls6 However, until Congress does define "mix­
ture," the courts should follow the Chapman approach. 
This section will discuss the Supreme Court's analysis of Con­
gress' objectives and the three factors the Court examined to further 
these objectives. The three factors form a "test" under which each 
prong must be satisfied before something can constitute a "mixture." 
This section analyzes and applies each prong to the cases discussed 
earlier in this Note to demonstrate the following results: first, the 
First Circuit's approach of including a suitcase with the weight of the 
cocaine for sentencing is erroneous; and second, the other circuits' 
conclusions exclude the weight of certain additives from sentencing is 
correct, but their approach is incorrect because they did not follow the 
Chapman "test." 
A. The Supreme Court's Analysis of Congress' Objectives 
The Chapman majority concentrated its analysis on the legisla­
tive histories of the CSP AA and the NPEA amendments,Is7 which 
called for a harsh penalty scheme for drug offenders. In using this 
approach, the majority determined that blotter paper must be included 
in the total weight of the LSD drug and that the possibility of dispro­
portionate sentences was not at issue in that case. Indeed, the majority 
seemed unconcerned with the possibility that LSD could be placed on 
sugar cubes and lead to disproportionate sentencing. The majority 
said that since most LSD drug offenders use blotter paper to transport 
and consume LSD, proportional sentences would result among all 
dealers using blotter paper. ISS Thus, the majority would view its hold­
153. Chapman, 111 S. Ct. at 1919. 
154. See supra notes 31· 41 and accompanying text. 
155. See supra notes 42-53 and accompanying text. 
156. See supra note I for a discussion of the proposed amendment to the Guidelines 
which would define "mixture." 
157. Chapman, III S. Ct. at 1925; see supra text accompanying notes 91-95. 
158. Chapman, 111 S. Ct. at 1928. 
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ing as conforming to the objectives of the SRA, the CSP AA and the 
NPEA. 
The dissent, on the other hand, focused its analysis on the SRA's 
legislative history, which called for uniform and proportional 
sentences. The dissent would have required that the "carrier" for 
LSD never be weighed, thus enabling uniform and proportional 
sentences at all times. 159 The dissent asserted that construing the 
word "mixture" to include blotter paper completely undermined Con­
gress' objectives of uniform and proportionate sentencing. Because of 
the possibility of disproportionate sentences whe.n LSD was placed on 
sugar cubes, the dissent believed that the term "mixture" must be con­
strued to never include a "carrier" when sentencing for LSD drug 
dealers.l60 However, in construing "mixture" in this manner, the dis­
sent did not provide for a harsh penalty scheme, thus ignoring the 
goals of the CSPAA and the NPEA. 
The objectives of the SRA, CSPAA and NPEA can be met, how­
ever, by applying the Chapman factors to other cases. Although the 
majority restricted its holding specifically to LSD and blotter paper, 
the Court focused on several broad factors that may be applied in 
other sentencing contexts. The three factors that the Court examined 
to define "mixture" so as to further Congress' goals under the SRA, 
the CSPAA, and the NPEA were: (1) whether there was a "mixture" 
using the dictionary meaning for mixture,161 (2) whether the "mix­
ture" was ingestible at the consumer level,162 and (3) whether the 
"mixture" was of the type that could be marketable at the consumer 
level. 163 Each prong must be satisfied in order to effectuate the multi­
ple goals of Congress: a harsh, but also uniform and proportional sen­
tencing scheme. 
1. Dictionary Meaning of Mixture 
Because neither Congress nor the common law had ever specifi­
cally defined the word "mixture," the Court defined "mixture" using 
its dictionary meaning. l64 Thus, whenever two substances are 
"blended together so that the particles of one are diffused among the 
particles of the other," they are considered mixed with one another. 165 
159. Id. at 1931-33; see supra text accompanying notes 104-11. 
160. Chapman, 111 S. Ct. at 1929. 
161. Chapman, 111 S. Ct. at 1926; see supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text. 
162. Chapman, 111 S. Ct. at 1925; see supra text accompanying notes 89-90. 
163. Chapman, 111 S. Ct. at 1925; see supra text accompanying notes 91-95. 
164. Chapman, 111 S. Ct. at 1925-26. 
165. Id. at 1926. 
1993] CRIMINAL LAW-SIFTING THROUGH THE "MIXTURE" PROBLEM 419 

The Court further elaborated that if a drug is not easily separated 
from or distinguished from another substance, it is "mixed" with the 
substance. 166 
When applying this definition to the fact patterns in United States 
v. Acosta 167 and United States v. Mahecha-Onofre, 168 both cases may 
be considered mixtures. Acosta involved cocaine dissolved into creme 
liqueur so that the cocaine could be smuggled into the country.169 
Since the cocaine was dissolved into the liquid, the particles of the 
creme liqueur and the particles of the cocaine were diffused among one 
another and neither substance retained a separate existence. To sepa­
rate out the cocaine, the creme liqueur had to be evaporated, thus, the 
cocaine and the creme liqueur were not easily separated or distin­
guished from one another; thus, the cocaine and creme liqueur combi­
nation resulted in a "mixture." 
In Mahecha-Onofre, the cocaine was chemically attached and dif­
fused into the fabric of the suitcase and was not easily separated from 
the suitcase. 17o Thus, the cocaine and the suitcase were "mixed" 
within the Court's definition. Consequently, both Acosta and 
Mahecha-Onofre satisfy the first prong of the test. 
In Robins,17l however, the two substances were probably not 
mixed within the above definition. The particles of cocaine arguably 
were not diffused among the particles of cornmeal. The cocaine re­
tained a separate existence from the cornmeal because the cornmeal 
was only placed next to the cocaine. l72 Because the cocaine was easily 
separated from and distinguishable from the cornmeal,173 the two sub­
stances never mixed within the Court's definition. The Robins court 
focused on ingestibility to determine that the cornmeal should not be 
included.l74 However, this Note suggests that the two substances were 
not even mixed. Thus, the first prong of the test was not satisfied and 
166. Id. 
167. United States Y. Acosta, 963 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1992). 
168. United States v. Mahecha-Onofre, 936 F.2d 623 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. 
Ct. 648 (1991). 
169. Acosta, 963 F.2d at 552. See supra notes 114-28 and accompanying text for a 
full discussion of the majority and dissenting opinions. 
170. Mahecha-Onofre, 936 F.2d at 626. See supra notes 145-48 and accompanying 
text for a full discussion of the opinion. 
171. United States V. Robins, 967 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir. 1992). See supra notes 129-44 
and accompanying text for a full discussion of the opinion. 
172. Robins, 967 F.2d at 1388. 
173. See infra note 188 for a discussion of whether to weigh the cornmeal with the 
cocaine if it were mixed together. 
174. Robins, 967 F.2d at 1389; see supra notes 129-44 and accompanying text. 
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the court's analysis ends. The cornmeal would not be included with 
the weight of the cocaine for sentencing. 
2. Ingestibility 
Once Chapman established that a dictionary definition of mixture 
did exist under the first prong, the Court also analyzed whether the 
"mixture" was ingestible. The Court noted that the blotter paper car­
rying the LSD was ingested just like cutting agents mixed with cocaine 
and heroin. 175 
When applying this prong of the test to Acosta, 176 the creme li­
queur and cocaine constituted an ingestible mixture. Both the creme 
liqueur and cocaine were marketed to be ingested, albeit the former 
legally and the latter illegally. Moreover, when the two substances 
were mixed together, the combination also formed an ingestible sub­
stance. However, this Note's analysis of ingestibility differs from the 
Acosta court's analysis. In Acosta, the court stated that the cocaine 
and creme liqueur "mixture" were noningestible. 177 The court made 
this statement so as to enable the district court to exclude the creme 
liqueur from the weight for sentencing purposes. However, under this 
Note's analysis, cocaine and creme liqueur are an ingestible mixture; 
thus, the sentencing judge would move to the final step in the 
analysis. 178 
In M ahecha-Onofre, 179 however, the suitcase and cocaine were 
not ingestible. 180 The suitcase was not like the blotter paper because 
the user would not lick or eat the suitcase in order to ingest the drugs. 
Instead, the suitcase was just being used as a container to carry the 
cocaine, even though the cocaine and the suitcase were chemically 
combined. The Mahecha-Onofre court determined that the discussion 
of ingestibility was unimportant to the outcome of Chapman and thus 
175. Chapman v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1919, 1926 (1991); see supra text accom­
panying notes 86-88. 
176. 963 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1992). 
177. Acosta, 963 F.2d at 552. See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of the majority court's discussion of ingestibility. Compare notes 123-25 and 
accompanying text for the dissent's criticism of the majority's analysis. 
178. See supra notes 100-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of the dissent in 
Chapman v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1919 (1991). 
Although United States v. Robins, 967 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir. 1992), failed the first prong 
and the judge would not proceed to the second step, the cornmeal and cocaine, if it were 
mixed, would be ingestible. The two substances mixed together could be consumed and 
thus would pass the second prong. 
179. 936 F.2d 623 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 648 (1991). 
180. Id. at 625-26. See supra text accompanying notes 147-48 and accompanying 
text for the First Circuit's anaylsis of ingestibility. 
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the court concluded that the suitcase should be included with the 
weight of the cocaine for sentencing PUrposes.1 81 This Note suggests 
that ingestibility is critical to the outcome of the Chapman decision 
and because the suitcase is not ingestible, Mahecha-Onofre fails the 
second prong. Thus, the judge would not include the weight of the 
suitcase with the weight of the cocaine for sentencing. 
3. "Market-oriented" approach 
The Chapman Court also used a "market-oriented" approach, 
which focused on the method of distribution of the drug to the user 
market. The Supreme Court found that LSD was usually attached to 
blotter paper and noted that although "hypothetical cases can be 
imagined involving very heavy carriers and very little LSD, those 
cases are of no import" for petitioner's claim. 182 The Chapman court 
recognized blotter paper as the "carrier of choice" for LSD drug traf­
fickers and thus, did not extend its holding to consider heavier carri­
ers. 183 Thus, a judge would focus on the typical method used by drug 
dealers to distribute a drug to the user market. To determine usual 
methods of distribution, a judge could refer to experts in the field. 184 
Occasionally, a creative drug dealer may intend to distribute a 
drug to the user market in an unusual form; nevertheless, the judge 
will focus on the usual method that the drug is distributed to the mar­
ket. Thus, the intent of the drug dealer, in the wholesale or retail 
market, is irrelevant to a judge's sentencing determination. This ob­
jective approach arguably would ensure that Congress' goals of hon­
esty, uniformity, and proportionality are furthered when sentencing 
the drug offender. 
In United States v. Acosta,18S the cocaine mixed with the creme 
liqueur was not the usual method of distribution for cocaine. 186 In the 
retail market, the cocaine would typically be extracted and then deliv­
181. Mahecha-Onofre, 936 F.2d at 625-26; see supra notes 145-48 and accompanying 
text. 
182. Chapman v. United States, III S. Ct. 1919, 1928 (1991). 
183. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 91-95. 
184. For example, in United States v. Robins, 967 F.2d 1387, 1389 (9th Cir. 1992), 
the court referred to a forensic toxicologist to determine that cornmeal was not a carrier 
medium or cutting agent for cocaine. 
185. 963 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1992). 
186. Id. at 554. The Second Circuit actually focused on whether the "mixture" was 
in a usuable form. Because creme liqueur and cocaine are technically "usable," the Second 
Circuit'S approach does not necessarily work. A better approach is to focus on whether the 
"mixture" was one that would "usually" reach the market in that form. See supra text 
accompanying notes 120-22 for the Second Circuit'S discussion on marketability. 
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ered to the user in a powdery form. 187 Acosta used the creme liqueur 
only as a method by which to smuggle the drug into the country and 
not as a method of distribution.. Thus, a court would exclude the 
weight of the creme liqueur from the weight of the cocaine for sentenc­
mg purposes. 
However, this conclusion was the result of fact finding by the 
judge. The sentencing judge may refer to experts in the field to deter­
mine, for example, if creme liqueur was typically used as a method of 
distribution. If so, then it would be included with the weight of the 
drug for sentencing. 188 
B. Comparing Congress' Objectives to the Results 
Congress' objectives of harsh yet honest, uniform, and propor­
tional sentences, arguably are fulfilled by use of the three prong Chap­
man test. 189 Therefore, unless Congress further defines "mixture,"I90 
a sentencing judge can utilize the Chapman test to achieve fair and 
uniform sentencing. The drug dealer who mixes cocaine with a com­
mon cutting agent191 will receive the same sentence as the drug dealer 
who distributes an equal weight of pure cocaine. 
Moreover, this test will allow courts to avoid including a suitcase 
or creme liqueur in the weight of a drug when it is clear that those 
items are merely containers to bring the drug to the marketplace. Re­
gardless of the increasing sophistication of drug smuggling, this test 
allows a judge to logically and coherently sift through complicated 
questions of fact to achieve a sentence that arguably relates to what 
187. See United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1317 (7th Cir. 1990), a./J'd sub 
nom., Chapman v. United States, III S. Ct. 1919 (1991). 
188. United States v. Robins, 967 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir. 1992), provided for an excel­
lent example of using an expert to determine if cornmeal was typically used as a method of 
distribution. In that case, the forensic toxicologist testified that cornmeal was not normally 
used as a cutting agent for cocaine. Thus, the judge determined that the cornmeal should 
not be weighed with the cocaine. Hypothetically, if cocaine and cornmeal were mixed 
together, the judge could refer to forensic toxicologists to determine that the cornmeal 
would not be weighed with the cocaine even if the two products were mixed together be­
cause cornmeal was not the typical cutting agent for cocaine. However, if cornmeal begins 
to become a typical method of distribution, then the judge could include it with the weight 
of the drug for sentencing. 
189. See supra text accompanying notes 31-53 for a discussion of the definition of 
Congress' objectives. 
190. See supra note 1 for an explanation of how the United States Sentencing Com­
mission is addressing this problem. Furthermore, the United States Sentencing Commis­
sion plans to publish revisions and define "mixture" in November of 1993. 
191. See supra note 4 for an explanation of "cutting" a drug. 
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Congress intended when it mandated that sentences for drugs should 
include the entire weight of substances mixed with drugs. 
CONCLUSION 
Without express direction from Congress, the jUdiciary has strug­
gled to sentence drug offenders within the conflicting objectives of the 
the Narcotics Penalties and Enforcement Act of 1986 ("NPEA") and 
the Guidelines. Congress desires uniform and proportional sentences 
for all federal convicts under the Guidelines, but also intends to 
"throw the book" at drug offenders with stiff jail sentences under 
NPEA. 
The potential conflict between these objectives surfaces when a 
judge must sentence a drug offender based on a drug "mixture." The 
sophisticated smuggling methods of drug dealers highlight the di­
lemma: what substances should a court include with the drug when 
weighing for sentencing? The Supreme Court's analysis in Chapman 
provides a clear path for federal judges immersed in the murky area of 
sentencing drug offenders. First, is the "mixture" a mixture within the 
dictionary definition? This establishes the essential groundwork. Sec­
ond, is the "mixture" ingestible? Since the nature of drugs is to con­
sume them in some fashion, Congress could only have intended to 
include ingestible "mixtures." Moreover, if the "mixture" is not in­
gestible, it is most likely a container whose purpose is to transport and 
conceal the drug. Finally, will the drug "mixture" reach the user mar­
ket in its present form? This final prong prevents judges from weigh­
ing those additives that will pass the first two prongs, but will not be 
brought to the ultimate user in that form. This method provides a 
coherent approach to sentencing drug offenders which arguably fulfills 
Congressional intent in the use of the word "mixture" in the sentenc­
ing statutes. 
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